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I. STATUS
A. PREPARATIONS FOR MARRIAGE
N 1993 a man and woman agreed to marry and in contemplation of
marriage they planned the purchase and renovation of a house. In
order to purchase the house, the woman created a trust to supply the
purchase price of the house with herself as trustee and beneficiary, and
the man agreed to live in the house and supervise improvements at an
hourly rate less a deduction for rent. The man was subsequently added as
a settlor, trustee, and beneficiary of the trust. In 1995, however, the wo-
man decided not to marry the man and sought to terminate their agree-
ments concerning the purchase of the house. An amicable agreement
could not be reached, and the woman hired attorneys to sue the man for
breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting for funds expended. The man
filed a counter claim against the woman and a suit against her attorneys
for conspiring to defraud and to injure him otherwise. The court entered
a summary judgment in favor of the woman and her attorneys. In re-
sponse to the man's appeal, the appellate court held' that the attorneys'
acts were within the context of adversarial representation of their client
(the woman) and that they owed no duty to the man in that regard.
"Even assuming [that their] actions went beyond the bounds of ethical
behavior, the remedy is public, not private."'2 Hence, because the man
had no cause of action against the attorneys, he could not maintain the
claim for conspiracy. 3
1. White v. Bayless, 32 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
2. Id.




1. Burden of Proof
Though the language of former section 3.644 was omitted from the
Family Code in 1973, the provisions of section 6.701 (formerly section
3.53)5 made it plain that a petitioner for divorce nonetheless bears the
burden of establishing an alleged ground for divorce and other material
allegations even though the respondent has failed to file an answer or to
appear at the trial.6 In Osteen v. Osteen,7 the wife had filed a petition for
divorce asserting an informal marriage, and her alleged husband failed to
file an answer or to appear at the trial. The court granted a divorce al-
though the alleged wife 8 presented no evidence to support her allegations
of an informal marriage. Hence, the judgment was reversed on appeal
and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.9
2. Elements of Proof
The most curious aspect of J. C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Heinrich' is the
belief in the legal acceptance of bigamy, which some of the persons in-
volved seemingly entertained. According to the facts related by the ap-
pellate court, a man and woman began living together in 1986. After
their first child was born in 1987, they agreed to be married, introduced
each other as husband and wife, and filed joint tax returns. They had
another child the following year. In April 1993 after their cohabitation
ceased, the man began living with another woman in March 1994. In
April 1994 he sued the first woman for divorce, and she promptly re-
sponded with a counter-suit for divorce. While these suits were pending,
the man bought a $100,000 life insurance policy for the benefit of his
"spouse, if living; otherwise equally to [their] then living lawful children
.... "11 He and the second woman had a child, and the man suddenly
died in December 1994. The first woman promptly applied to the Social
Security Administration for benefits as a widow. The second woman did
likewise and also filed her claim for the insurance proceeds along with
her proof of informal marriage. In reliance on this evidence, the insur-
4. 1969 TEX. GEN. LAWS 2707, ch. 888, § 1 at 2725 (§3.64) repealed by 1973 TEX.
GEN. LAWS 1596, ch. 577, § 23 at 1605.
5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.701 (Vernon 1998).
6. See Harmon v. Harmon, 879 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
writ denied), noted in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 48 SMU L.
REv. 1225 1263-64 (1995); Considine v. Considine, 726 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Tex. App.-Austin
1987, no writ) (dictum). See also Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary to the Title 1 of the
Family Code, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 911, 988 (1990); Joseph W. McKnight, Commentary to
the Title 1 of the Family Code, 5 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 281, 312 (1974).
7. 38 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.).
8. The headnote writer describes her inaccurately as a "putative wife" and inaccu-
rately describes her alleged husband as a "putative husband." Id. at 809-11. Those are
terms of art.
9. Id. at 814-15.
10. 32 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
11. Id. at 283.
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ance company paid the insurance proceeds to the second woman in Feb-
ruary 1995. In the following month, the first woman made inquiry as to
the policy and in May, made her claim for the insurance proceeds. The
company then filed an action for a declaratory judgment that the first
woman was not the decedent's widow, and the woman responded with a
counter suit for a contrary declaration. Various sorts of alternative relief
were sought by both parties, and the second woman was joined in the
fray. 12 The trial court concluded that statutory prerequisites to proof of
the first alleged informal marriage had not been met, and the first alleged
wife appealed.
When the suit was filed in 1995, section 1.91 of the Family Code 13 pro-
vided that as a prerequisite to proof of an asserted informal marriage, a
proceeding asserting the marriage had to be commenced within one year
of the terminated cohabitation of the parties. The appellate court held 14
that the man's suit for divorce, filed within the time specified in the stat-
ute, satisfied the need for a timely reliance on the validity of the marriage
by initiation of a proceeding, "as long as there has been no determination
on the merits of the proceeding that no common law marriage existed
"'15
In another suit 16 by a son to claim his father's entire intestate estate, a
woman claiming to be the decedent's informal wife intervened. The son
sought summary judgment based on the intervenor's deposition evidence
that she had not informed the Social Security Administration of the al-
leged marriage, that the woman did not obtain health insurance coverage
from her employer in favor of her alleged husband, that the alleged
couple did not maintain a joint bank account, and that in the decedent's
1994 federal income tax return and his 1998 bankruptcy petition the fa-
ther described himself as unmarried. The woman had also responded in
her deposition that the decedent had not married her formally because he
was so deeply in debt, and "he didn't want to ruin me."'1 7 The court,
thereupon, rendered summary judgment in favor of the son without con-
sidering the alleged wife's evidence of her informal marriage. On her
appeal, the court in In re Estate of Rodden18 concluded that the woman's
deposition testimony was insufficient as a matter of law to establish a
judicial admission that the decedent had not married the claimant, whose
presumably later (but timely-filed) response raised a fact issue as to the
12. Id. at 284.
13. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91 (Vernon Supp. 1995). The statute was later
amended (effective Sept. 1 1995) to provide that if a proceeding is not commenced within
two years of the date of separation there is a rebutable presumption that the couple did not
enter into an agreement to be married. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 1998) (as
amended in 1997) perpetuates this provision.
14. J.C. Penney, 32 S.W.3d at 287.
15. Id. at 288.
16. In re Estate of Rodden, No. 05-99-01229-CV, 2000 WL 567110 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2000, no pet.).




elements to establish an informal marriage. 19
In Eris v. Phares20 the determination of whether 2' a couple had en-
tered into an informal marriage turned, in large measure, on the way the
issue was submitted to the jury: that the couple was married before Janu-
ary 30, 1997. The jury had answered affirmatively. On the date referred
to, the man had already conveyed a house to the woman, and he asserted
in his suit for divorce that the transfer should be set aside for fraud. Evi-
dence of third persons, as well as the parties, was conflicting and ambigu-
ous as to the couple's living together and holding themselves out as
husband and wife. In denying the existence of the informal marriage
prior to January 30 1997, the woman relied strongly on the language of
the man's warranty deed (sworn before a notary public) that he conveyed
the house to the woman, "a single person," on that date. Considering all
the evidence, the Houston First District appellate court held that the evi-
dence was factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict and re-
manded the case for a new trial.22
C. STATE-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
Section 32.054(a) of the Election Code23 provides that "[a] person is
ineligible to serve as an election judge ... in an election if the person is
... related within the second degree by . , . affinity ... to an opposed
candidate for a public office or the party office of county chair in the
election." The wife of the county chairman of a political party had been
appointed as an election judge. The party chairman was an unopposed
candidate for reelection to that position. The local district attorney, with
whom the Election Division in the Secretary of State's office disagreed,
had concluded that the wife was prohibited from serving as judge and
sought the opinion of the Attorney General. The Attorney General
agreed with the latter view concluding that the Secretary of State's inter-
pretation of the Election Code was reasonable and as such, it would ordi-
narily be deferred to by the Attorney General.24 In this instance the
interpretation was also appropriate by "[girammar and sense."'25 The
statute's language of disqualification referred to a person related to an
"opposed candidate," and the words " a public office" and "party office"
were both objects of the preposition "for" defining the words "opposed
candidate."
19. Id.
20. 39 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
21. Id. at 715.
22. Id. at 715-16.
23. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 32.054(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).




II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. COMMUNITY PRESUMPTION
In Dutton v. Dutton26 the husband and wife had received a conveyance
of realty during their marriage from the wife's parents for an $18,000 note
of both spouses. The following year the grantors forgave the indebted-
ness. In their divorce proceeding the husband listed the property as com-
munity property in his sworn inventory. The wife claimed it as her
separate property, asserting that her parents (who did not testify) so in-
tended. The trial court concluded that the property was community prop-
erty and awarded the whole of it to the wife but granted the husband a
money judgment of $40,000 at interest secured by the property, but the
reason for fixing the lien on the property was apparently unexplained. In
his appeal, the husband asserted a separate interest in the realty with a
value of $56,000 on acquisition. Thus, the husband seems to have argued
that the forgiveness of the debt created a separate property interest in the
land (which it did not). He also seemed to have asserted that the initial
gift of property was of a value far in excess of the $18,000 paid. Just how
the trial court or the husband arrived at their values is not clear, but the
values were not contested on appeal. The appellate court refrained from
expressing an opinion on the husband's argument. In affirming the trial
court's finding that the realty was community property, the appellate
court relied on the husband's estoppel by his judicial admission in listing
the property as part of the community estate in his sworn inventory.27
Because the community presumption was not detracted from but was
supported by the facts of acquisition (as apparently presented to the trial
court), the conveyance met all the tests of a community purchase for
value at $18,000. The trial court was clearly correct in concluding that the
realty was community property. Putting aside the asserted actual value of
the realty when acquired as opposed to the apparent "selling price," the
subsequent cancellation of the indebtedness did not affect the character
of the property nor did it create a right of reimbursement in the hus-
band's separate estate for the excused liability, because the separate and
community liability for the debt were excused simultaneously. 28
Whereas in Dutton the force of the community presumption was en-
hanced by the separate property claimant's estoppel as well as the incep-
tion of title rule, at first glance in In re Case29 the presumption might
seem to be affected by statute. There the parties disputed the character
of a certificate of deposit purchased with funds deposited by the husband
in a bank account in the name of both spouses. That was evidently the
26. 18 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied).
27. Id. at 853-54 (citing Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 201-02, 338 S.W.2d
415, 419 (Tex. 1960) and United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Carr, 242 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex.
Civ. App.- San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd)).
28. For a discussion of other cases involving parental gifts to a spouse and assumption
of parental indebtedness on the property given by the donees see Joseph W. M'Knight,
Family Law: Husband and Wife, 42 Sw. L.J. 1 18 (1988).
29. 28 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
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only deposit in the account. The husband then withdrew the funds depos-
ited to purchase the certificate of deposit. Though, standing alone, the
community presumption would govern the character of the certificate,
section 438 of the Probate Code 30 provides that "[a] joint account be-
longs, during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the
net contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of a different intent. ' 31 But Section 437 goes on to
say that "a multiple party account created with community funds is sub-
ject to Article XVI, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution and will not in
any way alter community property rights"32 because (as the court some-
what inexactly explained) "the gift presumption is not a community prop-
erty right, but rather a separate property presumption. '33
In Case the character of the marital residence was also in dispute. The
property had been bought during marriage, and thus, it was presumed to
be community property.34 The cost of the house was $63,000. The wife
partially rebutted the community presumption by showing that $43,000 of
the purchase price was from the proceeds of sale of a house she had
owned prior to marriage. There is some ambiguity in the court's opinion
in this regard,35 but if those separate funds were indeed part of the
purchase price, the wife owned a proportionate part of the family home
as her separate property. On the other hand, if these funds had been
used to discharge an indebtedness for the purchase price, she was merely
entitled to reimbursement for the funds expended.
In Kline v. Kline36 the husband did not contest the conclusion of the
divorce court that vested stock options acquired from his employer were
community property. Supported by the testimony of the employer's pay-
roll manager that the options to buy stock of the corporate employer
were granted as an inducement of continued employment, he merely as-
serted that the unvested options were not community property and were
thus indivisible by the divorce court. His witness was unable to explain,
however, why the stock agreements themselves stated that all the options
were granted in consideration of past services-an uncharacteristic abdi-
cation of self-interest on the part of the corporate management. Relying
on the holding of the Texas Supreme Court in Cearley v. Cearley37 that
unvested military pension rights acquired during marriage are community
property subject to division by a divorce court, the conclusion of the San
Antonio Court of Appeals in Bodin v. Bodin38 that unvested stock op-
tions acquired during marriage by an employee-spouse are of community
character and similar holdings from other jurisdictions to the same ef-
30. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 438 (Vernon 1980).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 437.
33. Case, 28 S.W.3d at 159.
34. Id. at 160.
35. In re Case, 28 S.W.3d 154, 161 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
36. 17 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
37. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
38. 955 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.).
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fect,39 the Houston appellate court reached the same conclusion.40
B. REIMBURSEMENT
In Case the wife further asserted that she had spent $20,000 of separate
funds for community benefit but was unable to show the source of those
funds and, thus, their separate character. But if she had been able to
show that she had spent a determinable amount of separate funds for the
benefit of the community estate, she would have demonstrated a reim-
bursement claim though she might not have been able to trace specific
expenditures into existing community property.41 Tracing shows an own-
ership interest in particular property, which requires a more demanding
standard of proof, though the court may not award a lien on any particu-
lar property for its discharge.
In discussing the wife's right to reimbursement, the court relied on the
authority of Norris v. Vaughan42 but explained its reliance in a fresh man-
ner: "[W]hen separate funds are expended for normal community living
expenses, such as rent, food, etc., there is no right to reimbursement be-
cause these merely extinguish the obligation of each spouse to support
the family."'43 Thus, the court seems to relate the holding (denying reim-
bursement in Norris) to the narrower necessaries doctrine, rather than a
broader principle of personal contractual obligation on which the Su-
preme Court seemed to rely. But however the outcome in Norris is de-
scribed, payment for family support should ordinarily fall first on
community property to the exoneration of separate property and thus
create a right of reimbursement for separate property so used.44 In Case
the family home had already been sold and distribution of the proceeds
was the only problem before the trial court for which remand was
ordered.
In his suit for divorce underlying the wife's appeal in In re Gill,45 the
husband had asserted a community right of reimbursement for funds ex-
pended for the benefit of the wife's separate realty, which she brought
into the marriage. The spouses had borrowed $40,000 from a bank using
the wife's property as collateral. They deposited the proceeds of the loan
in a joint checking account, in which each also deposited earnings. The
spouses used the account to pay family bills, the expenses of improving
the wife's realty, and payment on their note. The trial court found that
39. In re Hug, 201 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984); Goodwyne v. Goodwyne, 639 So.2d 1210 (La.
Ct. App. 1994); In re Short, 890 P.2d 12 (Wash. 1995); Garcia v. Mayer, 920 P.2d 522 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1996).
40. Kline 17 S.W.3d at 446-47.
41. See Schmidt v. Huppmann, 73 Tex. 112 11 S.W. 175 (Tex. 1889); Horlock v.
Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
42. 152 Tex. 491, 503, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (Tex. 1953).
43. In re Case, 28 S.W.3d 154 161 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
44. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband & Wife, 43 Sw. L.J. 1 15 (1989).
Exceptions to the principle enunciated in Norris have tended to multiply over the years.
See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband & Wife, 51 SMU L. REV. 1047 1049 (1998).
45. 41 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
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the community estate was entitled to reimbursement for $23,500 and that
the wife should pay the remainder of the debt on the note. The husband
asserted a community right of reimbursement for $23,500 for community
funds used to improve the wife's separate property and to make principal
payments on their note which he seems to have argued were benefits to
the wife's separate property because they reduced their lien thereon. The
trial court also found that the wife's house at divorce was worth $62,500,
on the basis of evidence offered by the wife's appraiser. The husband
testified that the value at divorce was $70,000. The only evidence of the
house's value at marriage was that it was initially insured for $65,000.
Thus, the amount of the reimbursement award based on appreciation in
value was clearly erroneous. The judgment was reversed and the cause
remanded. 46
C. MARITAL PARTITIONS AND AGREEMENTS
An estate plan that was submitted to the Internal Revenue Service 47
for a private letter ruling on federal-tax consequences of a proposed es-
tate plan, illustrates the result of one sort of plan that may be prepared in
reliance on the 1999 amendment to the Texas Constitution 48 allowing
conversion of separate property to community property in addition to the
existing power (achieved in 1980) to convert prospective community
property to separate property. Although the ruling does not reveal the
names or domicile of the taxpayers and states that it may not be used or
cited as a precedent in other matters, the ruling may, nevertheless, pro-
vide some guidance as to the attitude of the federal Treasury
Department.
The husband (aged 73) owned two individual retirement accounts
(IRAs), both attributable to a rollover from the husband's employer-
sponsored retirement plans under section 408 of the Internal Revenue
Code. 49 Each account had a balance of somewhat over $600,000. Evi-
dently the couple had been married for some time, and the wife (aged 75)
had several children by a previous marriage. The couple sought review of
their estate plan, some of which had been executed. They entered into a
marital agreement by which the husband's two retirement accounts
(IRAs, containing the husband's separate property, as well as, some com-
munity property) were agreed to be wholly community property. The
two IRAs were then partitioned as community property in equal separate
shares for the husband and the wife. A further IRA, as yet unfunded,
was created for the wife as her separate property ("spousal IRA of indi-
vidual property"). The wife's spousal IRA named her children as pri-
mary beneficiaries with the husband as secondary beneficiary. The terms
of her IRA also provided that the wife will direct the custodian to dis-
46. Id. at 259.
47. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-37-055 (June 24 1999).
48. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (amended 1999).
49. I.R.C. § 408 (2001).
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tribute funds annually to her and her eldest child based on their joint life
expectancies subject to the minimum-distribution-incidental-death-bene-
fit rules. The couple sought a ruling that a transfer of the wife's interest
(emanating from the husband's two IRAs to the wife's spousal IRA) can
be achieved without incurring a federal tax.
Because the inquiry was posed in relation to section 408, the Revenue
Service so confined its ruling. 50 Although the deduction provisions of the
Revenue Code 5' allow a contribution to be made to an employee-hus-
band's retirement plan even though his wife may own a community inter-
est in that contribution under state law, that fact is seemingly irrelevant to
the applicability of section 408 to the plan and does not abrogate state
law. The Revenue Service, therefore, concluded that the wife may have
had a community interest in the husband's two IRAs. Because the couple
had converted the husband's separate property in the two IRAs to com-
munity property, that process does not constitute any distribution or
transfer of assets. 52 Nor does that process fail to meet the requirements
of section 408(a), 53 so that the resulting changed quality of the property
interests are for the exclusive benefit of each spouse. But the Revenue
Service nonetheless concluded that a transfer of the wife's property inter-
est in the husband's two IRAs to her spousal IRA would constitute a
taxable distribution of assets.54
III. CONTROL AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. CONSTRUCTIVELY FRAUDULENT DISPOSITION
In In re Hayden55 the husband had set up three trusts for his sons of his
first marriage with a third person as trustee in 1983. He remarried in
1985. The husband died in 1996, and his will was admitted to probate and
a peisonal representative was appointed. The beneficiaries of the trusts
asserted misappropriation of trust funds and the probate court sitting
with a jury rendered judgment in favor of the beneficiaries of the trusts
who showed constructive fraud or misappropriation of the trust funds on
the part of the decedent's widow. The widow appealed and thereafter,
filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy. Despite the widow's pleas to
the contrary, the bankruptcy court concluded that the claimants were not
collaterally estopped from asserting their claim of embezzlement against
the widow and that the misappropriated funds should be excepted from
the bankruptcy discharge.5 6
50. Rev. Proc. 99-4 1999-1 C.B. 115 124.
51. I.R.C. §§ 219-220 (2001).
52. Id. § 408(d)(1).
53. Id. § 408(a).
54. Id. § 408(d)(1).
55. 248 B.R. 519 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2001).
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B. ENFORCEMENT OF A JUDGMENT DEBT AGAINST PROPERTY
DIVIDED BY UNRECORDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
In 1955 a married couple had purchased a home and had taken title in
both of their names. On their divorce in 1963, the couple's residence was
awarded to the wife as her separate property, but the divorce decree was
not recorded. A creditor had later taken a judgment against the former
husband in April, 1980 and recorded it in May, 1980. On October 2 1980
the former wife sold the property to the plaintiffs who recorded the deed
the following day. The ex-husband's judgment creditor then levied exe-
cution on the property, and the defendant bought the property at the sale
and received a deed from the constable on October 20 1980. In 1996 the
plaintiffs finally filed the divorce decree for record and then brought suit
in trespass to try title as to the ex-husband's one-half interest in the land.
At that point, the defendant had not paid any taxes on the property nor
made any improvements on the property. The plaintiffs showed that the
former husband had no interest in the land at the time of the constable's
sale, but the defendant-purchaser asserted its rights based on its good
faith reliance on the deed. But the deed was a quitclaim deed, merely
reciting that it granted the ex-husband's interest. The Houston First
Court of Appeals held in Diversified, Inc. v. Hall57 that the defendant
could not assert its standing as a bona fide purchaser because it claimed
under a mere quitclaim deed. Has everyone forgotten about the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code section 34.046 enacted in 1879 but not re-
codified accurately in 1985?58 Section 34.046 states that "[t]he purchaser
of property sold under execution is considered to be an innocent pur-
chaser without notice if the purchaser would have been considered an
innocent purchaser without notice had the sale been made voluntarily
and in person by the defendant [debtor]. '59
C. LIENS ON HOMESTEADS
Without alluding to the decision of the appellate court below to the
same effect,60 the Texas Supreme Court in Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes,
Inc.6 1 authoritatively interpreted the requirements of article XVI, section
57. 23 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
58. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 34.046 (Vernon 1997).
59. The codifiers of 1994 omitted the phrase "[purchaser] other than creditor," which
omission should not be effective in that the codification was a non-substantive revision
under the requirements of Gov'T CODE § 323.007 (Vernon 1998) and was not amended by
either house of the legislature and was not subject to floor amendment in either legislative
house when offerred to the legislature. Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d
278 (Tex. 1999), does not appear to cover this situation. See Steven R. Collins, Continuing
Statutory Revision-Where Did the Civil Practice and Remedies Code Come From?, 50
TEX. B.J. 134 (1987). See also Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 139 (Tex. 1977).
60. Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 9 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000), noted
in Joseph W. MCKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 53 SMU L. REV. 995 1032 (2000).
61. 34 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000).
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50(a)(5)(A) through (D) of the Constitution 62 to apply to work and
materials for renovation of existing improvements on a homestead but
not for new improvements. After those provisions were added to the
Constitution (effective January 1 1998), the homeowner entered into a
mechanic lien contract with a builder to construct a new house on realty
that the owner had evidently previously occupied as his homestead. Soon
afterwards the owner notified the builder that he, the owner, did not re-
gard a lien for the work and materials as having fixed on his property
because the builder had not met the requirements of paragraphs (B) and
(D) of section 50(a)(5). 63 The builder then filed suit for a declaratory
judgment that his lien for the new improvements was valid in that the
requirements of that section apply only to renovation of existing im-
provements. Employing the canon of construction that a qualifying
phrase must be confined to the words or phrases immediately preceding
it, the court pointed out that the provision of paragraphs (A) through (D)
are immediately preceded by language referring only to renovation of
existing improvements. Although the owner argued that in proposing the
amendment of 1997, the Legislature could not have meant to omit the
prior requirement of spousal joinder in contracting a valid lien for any
improvement on homestead property and thus limiting the scope of sec-
tion 50(a)(5), the court saw no reason to depart from reading the clear
language of the amendment as proposed by the Legislature and adopted
by the electorate. 64 The court pointedly stated that it had not considered
whether the builder's lien fulfilled the requirements of Property Code
section 53.254,65 where the requirement of spousal joinder for a home-
stead improvement lien is preserved despite omission of that requirement
in the 1997 constitutional amendment.
A further interpretation of the 1997 amendments to Article XVI, sec-
tion 50 of the Texas Constitution66 was provided by the Texas Supreme
Court in a certified question from the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp.67 In order to procure a home
equity loan, borrowers were required by the lender to use a large portion
of the loan to discharge loans from certain other creditors without liens
on the homestead. Several months later the mortgagors sued the lender
to refund the money so paid on the ground that the lender's requirement
was invalid under the Constitution. The Texas Supreme Court was thus
called on to interpret two seemingly unreconcilable provisions of the con-
stitutional amendment, drafted in some measure on the floor of the Leg-
islature. Section 50(a)(6)(Q)(i) provides that a home equity lender
cannot require a borrower to apply loan proceeds "to repay another debt
62. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(5) (amended 1997): quote indented (B) through
(D).
63. Id.
64. Spradlin, 34 S.W.3d at 581.
65. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.254 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
66. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (amended 1997).
67. 23 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2000).
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except a debt secured by the homestead or a debt to another lender. '68
Section 50(g) provides that at least twelve days before the loan's closing
the lender must provide notice to the borrower that includes this lan-
guage: "Loans described in Section 50(a)(6), Article XVI, of the Texas
Constitution must not require [the homeowner-borrower] to apply the
proceeds to another debt that is not secured by [the home] or to another
debt to the same lender. '69 Both appellate courts concluded that the pro-
visions are irreconcilable. 70 The Texas Supreme Court reviewed the legis-
lative history of the amendment and found nothing to resolve the conflict
"other than speculation that the difference in the language [of the two
provisions] arises from an oversight."'71 The court concluded that "sec-
tion 50(a)(6)(Q)(i) provides the substantive rights of lenders and borrow-
ers while section 50(g)(6)(Q)(1) provides the language for the mandatory
notice to borrowers . . . therefore, we hold that section 50(g)'s notice
provisions do not independently establish rights or obligations for the ex-
tension of credit."'72 The provisions of the former accordingly prevail
over the latter.73 Recognizing the continuing misleading propensity that
the provision has, the court went on to recommend a further notice provi-
sion that may be included in transactions to explain conflict and thus to
avoid confusion. 74 Thus, the court concluded that a home-equity lender
may require a borrower to use loan proceeds to pay a third person a debt
not secured by the homestead. 75
Having had its conclusion sustained by the United States Supreme
Court (but by way of a different analysis), a Fifth Circuit panel in In re
Bartee76 in turn analyzed the high court's affirmance in the Chapter 13
lien-stripping case, 77 Nobleman v. Am. Savs. Bank:78 "The Supreme
Court rejected our reasoning that § 506(a) was rendered a nullity by
§ 1322(b)(2), but nevertheless, agreed with the end result-namely that
§ 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification provision protected the entire mortgage
[on the debtor's residence]. '79 In Nobleman the debtor-couple had sub-
mitted a Chapter 13 plan that valued their residence at $23,500 though it
was encumbered with a mortgage of $65,250. They proposed to pay only
the amount of the secured by the value of the property and to treat the
rest as an unsecured claim for which the mortgagee would receive noth-
ing. Both the Fifth Circuit Court and the United States Supreme Court
68. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(i).
69. Id. at § 50(g)(P)(1).
70. Stringer, 23 S.W.3d at 355 (citing Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp. 199 F.3d 190
192 (5th Cir. 1999)); Id. at 356.
71. Id.
72. Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 23 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. 2000).
73. Id. at 357.
74. Id. at 357-58.
75. Id. at 358.
76. In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 286 (5th Cir. 2000).
77. Nobleman v. Am. Says. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); noted in Joseph W. McKnight,
Family Law, Husband and Wife, 47 SMU L. REV. 1161 1179-80 (1994).
78. 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
79. Bartee, 212 F.3d at 286.
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held that the entire mortgage in the home was protected from discharge.
In Bartee80 the debtor's home was valued at $87,000 and there were two
liens against it, the first held by a bank for $88,840 and the second by a
homeowners' association for a maintenance assessment of $1,096. The
debtor's Chapter 13 plan called for treating the homeowners' associa-
tion's entire claim as unsecured, and thus as an unsecured claimant the
association would receive nothing but it would retain its lien. The associ-
ation objected to the plan and the bankruptcy court denied confirmation
of the plan. The district court affirmed that ruling. On the debtor's ap-
peal to the Fifth Circuit, the court undertook to apply the Supreme
Court's "ambiguous" 81 decision in Nobleman and at the outset per-
ceived 82 that the argument of the association was much like its own in
Nobleman.83 Just as a split in authority among the federal circuits
prompted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Nobleman, dif-
ferent views have now developed in interpreting its resolution. Aligning
itself with the position taken by the Third Circuit court8 4 and the Bank-
ruptcy Appeals Panel of the Ninth Circuit,85 the Fifth Circuit panel con-
cluded that a wholly unsecured lien of the association is not subject to the
anti-modification clause in section 1322(b)(2).8 6 This view, the court said,
not only comports with the language of the statute and its legislative his-
tory but also serves sound public policy.87 In response to the association's
further argument that the association's annual maintenance assessment
might be fitted into section 1322(c)(2), the court rightly rejected the fit as
"thoroughly unpersuasive. '88
IV. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A. DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
1. Request for Admissions
In Steffan v. Steffan89 the husband was served with a petition for di-
vorce and appeared at a hearing for temporary orders without counsel
but failed to file an answer. Eight months later the wife served him with
a request for admissions. Although on their face the requests indicated
the consequences for failure to respond, the husband received the re-
quests and did not answer them. Consequently thirty days after receipt
the requests were deemed admitted as a matter of law.90 Thereafter the
80. Id.
81. Id. at 285. See also id. at 290.
82. In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 286 n.12 (5th Cir. 2000).
83. Id. at 285-86, 288-89.
84. In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606 (3d Cir. 2000).
85. In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000).
86. Bartee, 212 F.3d at 288-96.
87. Id. at 289-95. For its policy arguments particular reliance is put on Jane Kaufman
Winn, Lien Stripping After Nobleman, 27 Loy. L. REV. 541 (1994).
88. In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 295 (5th Cir. 2000).
89. 29 S.W.3d 627 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no writ).
90. TEX. R. Civ. PROC. 169.
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wife had a hearing on her petition for divorce, and a property division
was awarded by the court. The husband then retained counsel and filed a
motion for a new trial, which was granted. In the new trial the husband
responded to further discovery requests, but the court denied withdrawal
of the prior admissions and precluded the husband from offering any evi-
dence contrary to those admissions and entered a final decree of divorce.
On the husband's appeal the Houston appellate court was unable to find
any merit in the husband's arguments based on his lack of counsel, his
lack of knowledge of the law, or his failure to answer his wife's petition as
somehow precluding his being subject to a request for admissions. Nor
did the court find any abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of his
request to withdraw his admissions. 91
2. Notice of Witnesses
In Elliott v. Elliott92 the ex-wife filed a bill of review to set aside a
decree of divorce approving a property settlement agreement entered
into almost four years before. At her hearing the petitioner had sought
to introduce medical records and affidavits of mental health-care provid-
ers to show her mental condition at the time the settlement agreement
was reached. The trial court sustained the respondent's objection to
opinion evidence on the ground that the petitioner had failed to identify
her health-care providers as experts. The petitioner had, however, identi-
fied her health-care providers in response to an interrogatory asking the
identity of persons from whom she had received health care but had
failed to do so in response to an interrogatory specifically directed to the
identity of her health-care experts. 93 In light of the petitioner's pleadings,
which put her mental condition in issue, and her identification of all those
who had rendered health-care who were later called to testify, the appel-
late court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in ex-
cluding her witnesses' testimony,94 but the court also concluded that the
error was harmless in view of the fact that the petitioner had failed to
meet the first prerequisite for a bill of review. 95
3. Severance of Claims in Divorce Proceedings
A claim may be properly severed only if the controversy involves more
than one cause of action so that the severed claim is one that would be
the proper subject of an independent suit not so interwoven with the re-
maining action that they involve the same issues and facts. 96 Thus, the
operation of a motion for severance of an independent cause of action in
a divorce proceeding is now limited by the conclusion of the Texas Su-
91. Steffan, 29 S.W.3d at 630-31.
92. 21 S.W.3d 913 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).
93. Id. at 921.
94. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. PROC. 193.6(a)(2)).
95. Id.
96. TEX. R. CIv. PRoc. 41.
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preme Court in Schlueter v. Schlueter97 that an assertion of fraud by one
spouse against another does not constitute an independent cause of ac-
tion, at least when not supported by particularly egregious facts, 98 and
even then its facts and resolution are so likely to be essential to the divi-
sion of property on divorce that severance is necessarily precluded. 99 In
In re Burgett'00 the Texarkana Court of Appeals entertained a mandamus
proceeding to vacate a severance order and to consolidate several fraud
claims involving third parties in a divorce proceeding. In that instance
the wife had sued the husband for divorce and had joined an action
against a corporation owned by both spouses and other individuals and
another corporation alleging fraud, conspiracy and breach of fiduciary
obligations in dissipating the community estate. In granting the relief
sought the court said:
[I]n order to determine the nature, extent, and value of the commu-
nity property and make a proper division of it, the disputed claims to
ownership of certain alleged community assets and the value of those
assets, as well as the allegations of conspiracy to dissipate or divert
community assets, must be explored and determined. Moreover, if
in the divorce action [the wife] establishes her ownership in some of
the disputed assets, that adjudication will not bind third parties who
claim to own an interest in those assets if their claims are determined
in a later separate suit .... [The wife's] rights may be jeopardized and
judicial economy may be compromised if the third-party claims are
not tried with, or before, the divorce action. 10 1
4. Right to Trial by Jury
In Crittenden v. Crittenden'02 the wife's filing suit for divorce was
promptly followed by the husband's suit, the trial date was continued on
the wife's motion, agreed temporary orders were entered, and the case
was set for trial. A successful mediation followed, including the signing
of a settlement agreement by both parties. But when the wife refused to
sign an agreed judgment, the husband set the case for trial on the non-
97. 975 S.W.2d 584, 586-88 (Tex. 1998).
98. See discussion of such circumstances in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Hus-
band and Wife, 53 SMU L. REV. 995 1002-05 (2000).
99. Thus, severance such as occurred in the Teas cases should not occur today. Teas v.
Teas, 469 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ); Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank,
460 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, no writ).
100. 23 S.W.3d 124 126 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
101. Id. at 127.
102. 2001 WL 357118 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Apr. 11, 2001, no pet.). In the compan-
ion report, Crittenden v. Crittenden, No. 99-0690-CV 2001 WL 356993 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio Apr. 11, 2001), no pet.), the court responded to the wife's argument that her
freedom of contract had been violated by this Texas no fault divorce statute, TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 6.001 (Vernon 1998). The court pointed out that marriage is a status created
by mutual consent and thus is not merely a contract. It is more accurate to say that mar-
riage arises out of a contract that creates a status. To say that marriage is only one or the
other is therefore meaningless. Furthermore, the legislature has the power to lay down
rules as to which agreements constitute enforceable contracts. In this instance the wife had
argued that she and her husband had made a contract to be married for 50 years. Clearly
all the ramifications of such an agreement (if made) are not enforceable.
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jury docket. After the trial date was reset three more times, the wife filed
a nonsuit. The court signed the order of nonsuit but noted that the hus-
band's suit and settlement agreement were still pending. Eight days later
the wife requested a jury trial. The husband objected to the wife's re-
quest on the grounds that the trial had been continued numerous times at
the wife's request, that a settlement had been agreed to, that no jury set-
ting was available for six months, and that the request was made solely
for the purpose of delay. At the pretrial hearing on the day of trial, the
court denied the wife's motion for continuance and for a jury trial. After
an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the husband a divorce and en-
tered the decree in accordance with the settlement agreement. The wife
appealed on the ground, among others, of her being denied a jury trial.
The appellate court concluded that because the jury request had been
made in writing within a reasonable time before the trial setting and not
less than thirty days before the actual trial date, the request was presump-
tively timely103 within Rule 216(a). 10 4 But under the circumstances, the
appellate court said the request was not timely filed under the exceptions
to the Rule, presumably on the ground that the jury trial would disrupt
the court's docket or impede the court's business.
5. Availability of Mandamus to Reinstate a Counter-Suit
Following a court-approved mediated settlement but before entry of
judgment the wife in In re Kasschau'0 5 took a non-suit of her suit for
divorce. Unaware of the non-suit the husband filed a counter-suit for
divorce. On discovering the state of things, the husband sought a writ of
mandamus to order the trial court to reinstate his counter-suit. Because
Rule 162106 provides a party an unqualified right to take a non-suit before
she introduces all her evidence and in the absence of any claim by the
opposing party for affirmative relief and also because the husband was
unable to show any exceptional circumstances why the remedy of appeal
was inadequate, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals de-
clined to address the trial court's unwillingness to consider the husband's
counter-suit for divorce. 0 7
6. Denial of Mandamus for Refusal to Enter Judgment on a Mediated
Settlement Agreement
The trial court in Kasschau'0 8 had also declined to enter judgment on
the parties' mediated settlement agreement, which the court had ap-
proved prior to the wife's non-suit. The appellate court concluded that
although the subject matter of the request was proper for a writ of man-
103. Crittenden, 2001 WL 357118 at *1.
104. TEX. R. Civ. P. 216(a).
105. 11 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
106. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162.
107. Kasschau 11 S.W.3d at 309-10.
108. Id. at 310-11.
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damus in the performance of a merely ministerial act by the trial court,109
the trial judge did not violate his ministerial duty in light of the facts of
the case. The issue was not whether the wife could revoke her consent,
and the trial court had held that the non-suit did not have that effect. The
issue was whether the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable.
The approval of a settlement does not necessarily constitute the court's
willingness to render judgment in the absence of an intention to achieve
that result.110 The settlement agreement expressly contemplated contin-
gencies relating to the intervention of the wife's alleged paramour. The
appellate court seems to say that by approving the settlement agreement
the trial court had merely approved it conditionally on the basis of con-
tingencies it contained. But before those contingencies occurred, the trial
court had realized that the settlement agreement called for the perform-
ance of an illegal act in relation to evidence under the wire-tap statutes"'
and was therefore invalid." 2 Although the husband argued that his wife
was estopped from questioning the validity of the agreement because she
had accepted a cash payment of $1,000 under its terms, the appellate
court responded that a void contract cannot be rendered enforceable by
estoppel. 113
7. Notice of Trial
In In re Parker"4 the wife petitioned for divorce. Her husband filed an
answer and requested a jury trial. The wife's attorney testified that notice
of the trial setting had been sent nineteen days before the date set for
trial. On receipt of that notice fourteen days before the setting, by letter
to the court-administrator the husband requested clarification of the ac-
tual setting, if any. The court-administrator did not respond. On the day
set for trial the husband did not appear, but the court went forward and
entered a post-answer default judgment, granting the divorce and divid-
ing the property. Thereafter, the husband took all appropriate steps to
perfect his appeal. After carefully analyzing Rule 245,115 the Texas Su-
preme Court's decisions in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.,1 1 6 Lo-
pez v. Lopez, 117 Director, State Employees Workers' Comp. Div. v.
109. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071(d) (Vernon 1998). See Alvarez v. Reiser, 958
S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, writ denied), a very similar case.
110. Kasschau 11 S.W.3d at 311 (citing S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857-
58 (Tex. 1995)).
111. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 16.02(b)(1) (Vernon 1994); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 37.09(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1999).
112. This analysis seems to comport to what the same court said of the Kasschau deci-
sion in Cayan v. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161 166 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
113. In re Kasschan, 11 S.W.3d 305, 314 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no
pet.) (citing Reyes v. Storage & Processors, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 722, 725 n.3 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1999, pet. denied) 11 S.W.3d 305, 314 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no
pet.).
114. 20 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
115. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245.
116. 134 Tex. 388, 393 133 S.W.2d 124 126 (1939).
117. 757 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Tex. 1988).
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Evans,118 and other decisions of the intermediate appellate courts, the
Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that "when a defendant receives
actual or constructive notice sufficient to comport with the requirements
of due process [as was the case here], but [has] less than [the 45 days'
notice] required by Rule 245, a reviewing court must apply the first prong
of the Craddock test [excusing the defendant when his default was not
intentional or due to conscious indifference but to a mistake or accident]
to determine whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial." 119 In light
of the husband's contention that he was under the impression that he
would receive 45 days' notice required by Rule 245, the court concluded
that his letter to the court-administrator and "his reasonable belief that
he would receive [the proper] notice ... negates a finding of intentional
conduct or conscious indifference."' 120
In Blanco v. Bolanos,'21 in which it was not certain that the respon-
dent-wife received any notice of the trial setting, the El Paso Court of
Appeals had held a week before the decision was rendered in Parker that
the wife was entitled to a new trial, even though her attorney in Hawaii
(where she then was) had received a facsimile notice fifteen days before
the hearing and was thus in compliance with Rule 21a 122 but not with
Rule 245.123
8. Conduct of Trial: Replacement of Juror
In Schlafly v. Schlaflya2 4 the husband argued on appeal that he had
been denied his right of trial by jury because the trial court had dismissed
a juror without a finding that the juror was "disabled from sitting." Thus
the husband relied on the language of the Texas Supreme Court in Mc
Daniel v. Yarbrough125 that the Texas Constitution and Rules of Civil
Procedure12 6 require that trial juries in district courts "consist of twelve
members unless not more than three jurors die ... or are disabled from
sitting."'21 7 A female juror had approached the husband twice on days
when he was testifying and said, "You need to smile more. '12 8 On this
showing the trial judge had dismissed the juror and replaced her with an
alternate. The husband argued that he was entitled to trial by twelve ju-
rors originally selected unless not more than three of those twelve jurors
die or are disabled from sitting. The husband also relied on a more recent
Texas Supreme Court case, Yanes v. Sowards,12 9 where the court said that
118. 889 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. 1994).
119. Parker, 20 S.W.3d at 818.
120. In re Parker, 20 S.W.3d 812, 819 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
121. 20 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.).
122. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a.
123. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245.
124. 33 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
125. 898 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1995).
126. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13; TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
127. MDaniel, 898 S.W.2d at 254.
128. Schalfly, 33 S.W.3d at 868.
129. 996 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Tex. 1999).
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a district court jury shall consist of "twelve original jurors." In Schalfly
the court held that the language in Yanes did not constitute a departure
from the standard laid down in McDaniel.130 Even if such a departure is
indicated, the court went on to say, there would be no reversible error
unless there is a showing of probable harm stemming from the differ-
ence,' 3 ' and its review of the entire record did not suggest that any harm
was done by the replacement of the juror with an alternate. 132
9. No Judicial Estoppel in New Trial as a Consequence of Statement
Made at Prior Trial
On remand for a new trial in Steffan v. Steffan 133 the husband argued
that his wife was judicially estopped at the new trial from receiving more
property at the new trial than she had testified was a proper award at the
previous trial. Saying that "judicial estoppel only applies if the party to
be estopped has made a sworn, prior inconsistent statement in a prior
judicial proceeding and [has] successfully maintained the prior position
... [the court concluded that the doctrine] does not apply to a contrary
position taken within the same proceeding.' 1 34 Thus, the husband took
his deemed admissions with him into the new trial whereas the wife was
not burdened by her prior testimony as to a fair division of property.
10. Defining "Family Member" For Purposes of Protective Orders
At the end of the hearing for divorce in James v. Hubbard135 the judge
said "I am going to grant this divorce in this case." That was in October,
1997 but a decree of divorce was not signed. In February, 1998 the wife's
mother alleged that the husband had committed acts of family violence
against a "family member" under Section 81.001.136 After a hearing the
court granted a protective order against the husband in March 1998.
Within 30 days the husband filed his motion to appeal the protective or-
der. His ground for appeal was that the former mother-in-law was not a
"family member" within section 81.001 and Government Code section
573.024137 as he and his former wife had been divorced in October, 1997.
The San Antonio appellate court held that the protective order to pre-
clude family violence was an appealable order even if the protective or-
der from which the appeal was taken had expired, because of the social
stigma attaching to it.138 The court went on to say that if the divorce had
130. Schalfly v. Schalfly, 33 S.W.3d 863, 869 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no
pet.).
131. Id. at 870 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 44.1; M'Daniel v. Yarbrough, 898 S.W.2d 251,253
(Tex. 1995)).
132. Schalfly, 33 S.W.3d at 867 n.1.
133. 29 S.W.3d 627, 631-32 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). See
supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
135. 21 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
136. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 81.001 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
137. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 573.024 (Vernon 1994).
138. James, 21 S.W.3d at 560.
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been granted, the trial court would have been without the power to grant
the order as the person seeking it would not have been a family mem-
ber.139 An oral rendition of divorce can constitute a final judgment, 140
but whether a final judgment was rendered depends on the language of
the court. At the hearing in October, 1997 after saying that he "was go-
ing to grant this divorce," the judge went on to say that he wanted to
enter a judgment three days later. But no decree was actually signed un-
til May 1998. In the view of the appellate court the trial judge had never-
theless not clearly expressed a present intent to grant a divorce
immediately after the hearing. Thus, the couple was still married at the
time that the protective order was granted and the trial court's order was
therefore affirmed.141 Judge Alma L6pez dissented on the ground that
the oral rendition was indeed a final judgment of divorce, as the May
1998 order recited that the divorce was "judicially... RENDERED...
on October, 31 1997."
11. Motion for New Trial
Lee v. Lee142 is a sequel of a prior appeal of a divorce proceeding 143 in
which the Houston First District Court of Appeals concluded that there
had been no informal marriage prior to a ceremonial marriage of the par-
ties1 44 and remanded the case for a division of the property. The prop-
erty at issue included small pieces of realty which the woman had
transferred to the husband (in accordance with alleged Taiwanese cus-
tom) at the commencement of their cohabitation. At this point the case
was very similar to Eris v. Phares,145 but here the similarity of the two
cases diverges. On remand the wife's counsel appears to have caused her
to stipulate that the properties in issue were the husband's separate prop-
erty and the divorce court entered judgment accordingly. The wife then
got new counsel and filed a motion for new trial on the ground that her
prior lawyer had entered the stipulation contrary to her wishes and had
not allowed her witnesses to testify as she desired. The trial court denied
her motion, and the wife appealed. In response to her argument that the
trial court should have granted the motion for new trial because her at-
torney had coerced her to make the stipulation, the appellate court con-
cluded that even if her view of the facts were accepted, coercion as a
ground for reversal in such a situation must come from the opposing
party and not from her own counsel.' 46 The appellate court went on to
say that the record failed to show that the trial court had not denied her
139. Id. at 561.
140. Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1969).
141. James v. Hubbard, 21 S.W.3d 558, 561-62 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
142. 44 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
143. Lee v. Lee, 981 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
144. Id. at 907.
145. 39 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
146, Lee, 44 S.W.3d at 151 (citing Kosowska v. Kahn, 929 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1996, writ denied)) (a case involving coercion in making a contract).
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an opportunity to present her evidence, though it appears from the opin-
ion that it was her contention that it was the act of former counsel (in his
failure to present evidence) of which she complained. Much of the confu-
sion at trial and on appeal seems to have stemmed from lack of communi-
cation between the former attorney and his client due to
misunderstanding of language and consequently an injustice may have
therefore occurred.
12. Death of a Party After Decree
In In re Wilburn147 the court granted a divorce of the spouses and di-
vided the community estate in November 1998. After the husband was
killed in late December 1998, the court entered a decree of divorce on
March 19 1999, reducing its prior orders to writing. The ex-wife then filed
a motion for new trial, which the court granted on March 23 1999. On
motion for reconsideration by the ex-husband's father in June 1999, the
court entered a written order stating that the motion previously granted
was a motion for partial new trial and that the decree of divorce and
property determinations were not affected. This order was substituted for
the March 19 1999 order. The ex-wife took an appeal from the later or-
der,148 which in effect had undone the ex-wife's motion for a new trial on
property issues.
The appellate court concluded that the spouses were divorced on oral
rendition of the divorce in November of 1998, and a motion for new trial
(not based on the husband's death) could be taken as to the division of
property. 149 Because there was no evidence to support the trial court's
order as to property division, the June 1999 order in regard to the disposi-
tion of property was set aside. 150
13. Order for Support Pending Appeal
In In re Boyd151 the husband filed his notice of appeal to a divorce
decree and his bond to supersede the judgment on June 26. The wife filed
a motion on June 28 for reasonable attorney's fees and support pending
appeal. A hearing was had on that motion on July 7. After the hearing,
the court recessed the hearing. Despite the wife's advising the court that
Section 6.709152 required that an interlocutory order of the sort sought
had to be made by July 26, the court did not resume the hearing until
August 13 and entered an order on August 21 favoring the wife.' 53 On
the ex-husband's request the appellate court granted a writ of mandamus
to set aside the trial court's order, and he requested a writ of prohibition
147. 18 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied).
148. Id. at 839-40.
149. Id. at 842.
150. Id. at 844.
151. 34 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 2000, pet. filed).
152. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.709(a) (Vernon 1998).
153. Boyd, 34 S.W.3d at 710.
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against its enforcement should the court fail to- vacate the order.154
14. Appeal
a. Restricted Appeal
In Osteen v. Osteen'55 the alleged husband as respondent in a divorce
proceeding took a restricted appeal to a decree of divorce in which the
petitioning wife had failed to prove the material allegation of an informal
marriage. The four elements necessary for a restricted appeal are (1) no-
tice filed within six months of the date of the judgment, (2) by a party to
the suit, (3) who did not participate at the trial, and (4) when the error
complained of is apparent from the face of the record.' 56 The first two
elements were clearly satisfied as was the fourth because the record re-
vealed that neither had offered any evidence of the alleged informal mar-
riage. 157 The dispute turned on the third element, whether the appellant
participated in the trial, that is whether he participated in the decision-
making event that resulted in the judgment adjudicating his rights.158 The
appellee asserted that he had participated in a proceeding called to con-
sider her motion for a new trial filed in response to the trial court's order
setting aside an oral judgment in her favor and dismissing her petition for
divorce. 159 During that hearing in October 1997 the appellant appeared
by his attorney, but the record of the hearing was not among the papers
before the appellate court. As to that matter, the appellate court's opin-
ion relied on established precedent 160 to the effect that such participation
would not preclude the appeal in this instance because the motion for
new trial was totally unrelated to the final judgment entered in July, 1999
which the appellate court later set aside. 161 Because the grounds for a
limited appeal were satisfied, the court then concluded that the wife had
failed in bearing the burden of proving the existence of an informal mar-
riage to disolve.
b. Record: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
In the division of the community estate the trial court in In re Morris162
awarded the wife $180,000 in cash but failed to explain the basis for the
award apart from an award of $5,000 as reimbursement for medical ex-
penses. The trial court denied the husband's request for additional find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellate court held that the
154. Id. at 711
155. 38 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.).
156. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c); Osteen, 38 S.W.3d at 811-12.
157. Osteen, 38 S.W.3d at 813-14.
158. Withem v. Underwood, 922 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. 1996).
159. Osteen, 38 S.W.3d at 812.
160. Lawyers Lloyds of Tex. v. Nett 137 Tex. 107 152 S.W.2d 1098 (1941); South Mills
Mushroom Sales v. Weenick, 851 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
161. Osteen v. Osteen, 38 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no
pet. h.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 30).
162. 12 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.), commented on in Jo-
seph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband & Wife, 53 SMU L. REV. 995 1008 1016 (2000).
2001] 1405
SMU LAW REVIEW
valuation of $180,000 was a controlling issue having a direct effect on the
judgment, and the husband was therefore entitled to the findings and
conclusions requested. 163
c. Failure to Divide All the Community Property
In Byrnes v. Byrnes 64 it was asserted as a ground for appeal that the
trial court had inadvertently failed to divide all the community property.
Although a divorce court may not render a final decree of divorce with-
out also dividing the divisible estate of the parties before the court, 165 it is
not altogether clear that reimbursement rights between spouses are nec-
essarily included in that rule and even less clear that obligations of
spouses to third persons need to be addressed by the divorce court, as
they are certainly not assets of the spouses' estate. But a divorce court
ordinarily deals with both of these matters in rendering a divorce decree
if such matters are brought to the court's attention. In Byrnes the appel-
lant-wife complained that the court had failed to deal with the parties'
debts, but because she failed to raise the issue before the trial court, the
appellate court held that she had waived any right to complain. 166
d. Consequences of Mischaracterization of Property
Under the rule in Jacobs v. Jacobs167 remand to the trial court is ordi-
narily necessary when it is shown on appeal that the divorce court mis-
characterized separate or community property. In Case v. Case168 there
was not only mischaracterization of assets but also significant errors in
their valuation. Remand to the trial court for redivision of the commu-
nity estate was therefore necessary. 169
e. Attorney's Misconduct and Award of Costs to Opposing Party
In Schlafly v. Schlafly the Houston Fourteenth District appellate court
was critical of counsel for both parties in straying outside the record to
introduce extraneous matter in their arguments.170 The misrepresenta-
tions of the husband's counsel were so egregious that he was ordered to
163. Morris, 12 S.W.3d at 885-86 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 297); Finch v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d
218, 221 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.) (quoting Balderama v. W. Cas. Life
Ins. Co., 794 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 825
S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1991)).
164. 19 S.W.3d 556, 560-61 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).
165. See In re Johnson, 595 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ). As to
debts owed to third persons, see Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband & Wife, 51
SMU L. REV. 1047 1078 (1998).
166. Byrnes 19 S.W.3d at 561.
167. 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law:
Husband & Wife, 40 Sw. L. J. 1, 38 (1986); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband &
Wife, 42 Sw. L. J. 39-40 (1988); Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband & Wife, 53
SMU L. REV. 995 1042-43 (2000).
168. 28 S.W.3d 154 161-62 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
169. Id. at 162.




pay all costs of the appeal.171
B. MAKING THE DIVISION
1. Property Settlement Agreements in Anticipation of Divorce
Unless recited in open court and made part of the record, a binding
property settlement must be in writing as provided for in Family Code
section 6.602172 (formerly section 158.0071 enacted in 1995). The same
rule applies to an agreement in aid of divorce under section 7.006.173 Be-
cause the consequences may be different, however, there is good reason
to know from the start under which banner one chooses to sail. In some
instances parties to a divorce, or one of them, seem to have given that
matter little thought. In Byrnes v. Byrnes174 the appealing wife com-
plained of the divorce court's refusal to enforce a section 7.006 agreement
incidence to divorce that the husband had repudiated under section
7.006(a) in his answer to the wife's petition. The agreement provided that
the husband would assign to the wife all current and future interest of his
Air Force retirement benefits. The trial court had also ruled that the
agreement was not binding as a mediated settlement agreement under
section 6.602.175 The appellate court sustained the trial court's ruling on
the non-binding effect of the property settlement agreement on the basis
of the husband's repudiation and the provision of the agreement itself
that the court should approve the agreement. 176 In response to the wife's
argument that the agreement should stand as a partition, the appellate
court pointed out that the agreement did not provide for a division of any
interest but only for an assignment. 177 Nor was the spouses' agreement
enforceable as an ordinary contract apart from the term of the contract
that required court approval. The wife's argument also disregarded the
fact that, apart from its standing as a property settlement contract, Texas
spouses cannot by mere agreement change the character of their commu-
nity property to separate property. 178
Cayan v. Cayan179 involved a mediated property settlement reached by
the spouses under section 6.602 and approved by the trial court despite
the effort of the husband to repudiate it. The appellate court upheld the
trial court's ruling in that regard, and though the husband had not raised
any constitutional or statutory objections to preserve his points for appel-
late review, the appeals court nevertheless did not regard section 6.602 as
171. Id.
172. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602 (Vernon 1998). Although, as seen in Schalfly, un-
written terms continue to be advanced in argument. Schalfly v. Schalfly, 33 S.W.3d 863,
863 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
173. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.006 (Vernon 1998).
174. 19 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).
175. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602 (Vernon 1998).
176. Byrnes, 19 S.W.3d at 559-60.
177. Id. at 559. The court might have cited Hibbler v. Knight, 735 S.W.2d 924, 926-27
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
178. See Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. 1981).
179. 38 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
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in conflict with section 7.006 or 4.102 and the underpinning of the latter in
article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution. Distinguishing the con-
clusion in In re Kasschau,180 which the court described as dealing with a
void section 6.602 agreement (because of an "illegal provision" in the
agreement), the court concluded that a valid section 6.602 settlement
agreement is irrevocable by the parties "notwithstanding Rule 11 ... or
another rule of law."'1 81 "[S]ection 6.602 [is] simply ... an exception to
section 7.006(a) whereby parties to a divorce may elect to make their
agreement binding as of the time of its execution rather than at the subse-
quent time [when] the divorce is rendered."' 82 Nor is a section 6.602
agreement subject to the trial court's determination that the settlement is
just and right as provided in sections 7.001 and 7.006.183 Section 6.602
agreements can also divide separate property interests as the spouses
deem fit. 184 Finally, the court said,
[I]f a party fails to exercise diligence in investigating facts or law or
otherwise enters into a section 6.602 agreement inadvisedly, he will
not be rewarded for doing so with a reprieve from the agreement.
Conversely, if a party is wrongfully induced to enter into a section
6.602 agreement, he has the same recourse as one who discovered
such a circumstance after judgment was entered on a non-section
6.602 agreement. 185
In Elliott v. Elliott 86 two days prior to the setting of the final hearing
for divorce, the wife without counsel entered into a section 7.006 property
settlement agreement with her husband, who was represented by counsel.
The divorce court approved the agreement and entered a decree in accor-
dance with its terms. Almost four years later the ex-wife brought an eq-
uitable bill of review to set aside the decree, although she had received all
the benefits to which she was entitled under the agreement. Tne benefits
included compensation for employment by a corporation controlled by
her ex-husband even though she had not been allowed to perform actual
services for the corporation. The trial court dismissed her claim because
she had failed to make a prima facie case for a bill of review under the
first of the three prerequisites for that relief in Baker v. Goldsmith:187
that the petitioner could show "a meritorious defense to the cause of ac-
tion alleged to support the judgment. 188 Under these circumstances, the
appellate court concluded that she should show that the agreement to
divide the community estate was not just and right when made. 189 The
180. 11 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
181. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d at 165.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 166 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602(c)).
184. Id.
185. Cayan v. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no
pet.).
186. 21 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
187. 582 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1979).
188. Id. at 406
189. Elliott, 21 S.W.3d at 917-19 (citing a similar dispute in Martin v. Martin, 840
S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied)).
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Fort Worth appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of her claim,
as well as an award of attorney's fees and other costs incurred by the ex-
husband in defending her suit as provided in the settlement agreement.' 90
In a Texas divorce proceeding, the wife in Johnson v. Johnson'91 sought
to impeach a prior North Carolina separation decree barring her from
asserting any right to her husband's retirement benefits that had arisen
during marriage. Although the basis for the North Carolina order was an
unsigned (and thus unenforceable) agreement allegedly entered into by
the wife with her husband, her earlier effort to invalidate the decree in
North Carolina had failed because she had waited too long before attack-
ing the decree. Hence, the Texas court was bound to give effect to the
sister-state's order.192
2. Adjudication of Division
In Wilson v. Wilson 193 the husband objected to the divorce court's divi-
sion of property and award of attorney's fees to the wife. His appeal
failed because he was unable to show from the evidence in the record that
the division (including the provision for attorney's fees) was so unjust and
unfair as to amount to an abuse of discretion. 194 In making the award of
attorney's fees the decree stated that the court did so "to effect an equita-
ble division of the estate of the parties."'1 95 In this language the appellate
court found a suggestion that the trial court took attorney's fees into ac-
count in making the property division.196 Although the couple had been
separated for ten years prior to the divorce, all property acquired was
presumptively community property and the husband had not borne the
burden of proving that any property was his separate estate. 197
C. EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY
In In re Smith198 an ex-husband sought the application of section
523(a)(15) 199 of the Bankruptcy Code to relieve him of obligations of his
agreed divorce decree, apart from ex-spousal maintenance or child sup-
port. This provision enacted in 1996 allows a discharge of a debt "in-
curred by the debtor in the course of a divorce" when "discharging such
debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimen-
tal consequences to a spouse ... ."200 In their divorce decree incorporat-
ing their agreement, the ex-husband was ordered to pay a mutual credit
debt for tools bought for his use and a business debt, and the ex-wife was
190. Id. at 922.
191. 37 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.).
192. Id. at 526-27 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
193. 44 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
194. Id. at 600-01.
195. Id. at 600.
196. Id..
197. Id. at 601.
198. 256 B.R. 590 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(A) (2001).
200. Id. at § 523(a)(15)(A)-(B).
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ordered to pay another mutual credit debt and medical bills. Each was
also required to pay one-half of the couple's federal tax liability. In the
course of two years, the ex-wife had substantially reduced the credit debt
which the ex-husband had agreed to pay, and she had made minimum
payments toward discharging the credit debt she had agreed to pay. She
had also saved child support payments toward their children's later ex-
penses of education. In that time the ex-husband had evidently not dis-
charged any of his non-support obligations imposed by the divorce decree
but had received a bankruptcy discharge for other substantial indebted-
ness. His new wife was apparently in ill-health, but the ex-husband did
not offer evidence of any unpaid medical expenses.201 His pleadings and
testimony with respect to assets and liabilities, however, were so demon-
strably misrepresented that his credibility had been seriously undermined
so that the court was unable to find his inability to pay the agreed
debts.20 2 Although the ex-wife's financial situation was substantially bet-
ter than that of the ex-husband, the court concluded that further relief of
the ex-husband from the non-support debts imposed by the divorce de-
cree would impose some hardship on the ex-wife.203 In denying the relief
sought, the court concluded that "if the debt were discharged, [the ex-
wife] would, in effect, be punished for apparently handling her financial
affairs since the divorce more responsibly than has [the ex-husband]." 204
D. OTHER POST-DIVORCE DISPUTES
Two cases dealt with post-divorce disputes that were or should have
been foreseen by the parties. In Stephens v. Marlowe205 the couple was
divorced in 1989, and the decree of divorce awarded the wife "all sums
... related to any... retirement plan, pension plan,.., or other benefit
program" in her name. 20 6 In late 1990 the ex-wife, as a party to a class-
action against her former employer in connection with its pension plan,
received $50,000. In late 1992, the defendant-employer informed the ex-
husband by letter about the outcome of the action. Believing that he was
entitled to a share of the proceeds, the ex-husband commenced an action
against his ex-wife and was awarded one-half of those proceeds. The ex-
wife appealed. Relying on the principle of res judicata, the Texarkana
appellate court found the language of the divorce decree conclusive as
the ex-wife's entitlement to all the proceeds of her action as there
provided.207
Swoboda v. Swoboda208 was a somewhat more difficult case. The par-
ties were divorced in late 1995. The decree provided that the wife was
201. Smith, 256 B.R. at 592.
202. Id. at 593.
203. Id. at 593-94.
204. In re Smith, 256 B.R. 590, 594 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001).
205. 20 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.).
206. Id. at 252.
207. Id. at 254.
208. 17 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
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entitled to all of the husband's interest in a thrift plan maintained by his
employer. In 1996 a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") ac-
cordingly provided an award of $771,000 for the ex-wife, who in 1997
made a claim against the ex-husband for the tax-liability she had incurred
as a consequence of her receipt of the award under the decree. In af-
firming a summary judgment for the ex-husband, the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals concluded that
[b]y providing that the cash award would be paid out of [the ex-hus-
band's] interest in the thrift plan, the decree contemplated that this
distribution would constitute a taxable event .... [The ex-husband
agreed] to the QDRO that was subsequently entered by the court
which identified [the ex-wife] as an 'alternate payee' of the thrift
plan. But once the QDRO was entered without objection, and the
[ex-wife] received her distribution, she had knowledge or should
have had knowledge that she would be responsible for the federal
income tax on the award.209
The Internal Revenue Code provides that as to any amount of money
distributed to a former spouse of a distributee of a qualified trust, the
former distributee-spouse will be taxed for the distribution.210
In granting a divorce in 1980 the trial court in Reiss v. Reiss211 found
that the parties had a vested interest in the husband's employer's retire-
ment plan as community property and awarded the wife fifty percent of
the husband's pension benefits when and if received. The ex-husband
remarried, continued to work for the same employer, and retired in 1998.
The ex-wife moved to enforce the decree, and the trial court awarded her
one-half of the entire pension benefits. On the ex-husband's appeal, the
Houston First District Court interpreted the 1980 decree as awarding the
wife fifty percent of the community portion of the retirement benefits,
relying on the reference to the vested interest in the 1980 decree.212 The
court went on to say that if the 1980 decree required the wife's commu-
nity interest in the benefits to be valued as of the date of receipt, it would
now impermissibly award a portion of the ex-husband's separate property
to the ex-wife, 21 3 contrary to the Texas Supreme Court's 1983 decision in
Berry v. Berry.214 But the decision in Berry was not retrospective in ef-
fect.215 Because the consequences of that conclusion could the husband's
separate property, the court had this to say:
Here, the divorce judge expressly found the parties had a vested,
community-property interest in the retirement plan. Due to the
community's portion being valued at the date of receipt, he then
awarded some of what likely was [the ex-husband's] separate-prop-
209. Id. at 280.
210. 26 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(a) (2001).
211. 40 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.), 2001 Tex. App.
Lexis 704.
212. Id. at 608.
213. Id. at 612-13.
214. 647 S.W.2d 945, 946 (Tex. 1983).
215. Reiss, 40 S.W.3d at 613.Id. at 947.
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erty interest in those benefits to [the ex-wife]. However, we presume
that the divorce judge found whatever he divided to be entirely com-
munity property. His finding so indicates, and we would presume
that even had he made no express finding. Therefore, [the ex-hus-
band] is faced in this collateral attack with a potentially erroneous,
but not void, finding that all of the divided property was community.
Because the divorce court unquestionably had subject-matter juris-
diction to characterize and then divide community property, [the ex-
husband] cannot prevail.2 16
The Waco appellate court held in Weaver v. Keen217 that the divorced
wife, as designated beneficiary of two ERISA-qualified pension plans,218
could not take the benefits thereunder on the employee-ex-husband's
death despite the fact that she was named as the primary beneficiary.
The decedent's interest in the plans was acquired during the couple's
marriage. Furthermore, the decedent had designated his wife as the pri-
mary beneficiary and his mother as the alternative beneficiary. In their
1982 divorce the husband's interest in the plan was awarded to him, but
he failed to change the beneficiary designations. The ex-husband later
remarried and died twelve years later. The ex-wife sued to establish her
right as primary beneficiary. The Waco court concluded that applicability
of Family Code § 9.302 (Pre-Decree Designation of Ex-Spouse as Benefi-
ciary in Retirement Benefits and Other Financial Plans)2 19 was clearly
preempted by the terms of the federal act.220 Putting aside a federal
Sixth Circuit appellate case to the contrary, 221 the court followed deci-
sions of the Fifth and other circuits222 in concluding that a divorce termi-
nates a former spouse's designation as primary beneficiary of an ERISA
plan. Further, the Fifth Circuit court had concluded that a spouse desig-
nated during marriage as an ERISA beneficiary of a life insurance policy
had waived her benefits in an agreed divorce decree.223 In that case, the
ex-wife's counsel had drafted the divorce settlement agreement by which
the husband took the retirement benefits as his separate property. The
court held that the ex-wife therefore would be deemed to have waived
her right to the benefits voluntarily and in good faith.2 24
In In re Alford,2 25 the issue before the appellate court was whether the
trial court intended its order as a clarifying order, and whether it was
essential that the court hold a trial on the merits before issuing a clarify-
216. Id. at 616.Reiss, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 704 at *21-24.
217. 43 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.), 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 215.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2000).
219. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.302 (Vernon 1998).
220. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, __ U.S. __ 121 S. Ct. 1322
149 L. Ed.2d 264 (2001).
221. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh 119 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 1997).
222. See Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co. 18 F.3d 1321 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1994); Fox Valley
& Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 280-81 (7th Cir. 1990);
Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 1989).
223. See Brandon, 18 F.3d at 1326.
224. Weaver v. Keen, 43 S.W.3d 357, 543-44 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).
225. 40 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
[Vol. 541412
HUSBAND AND WIFE
ing order. In its decree on the wife's motion the court had awarded as
her separate property 200,000 frequent flier miles attributed to the hus-
band by Lufthansa Airline (not a party to the suit). The ex-wife asserted
that her ex-husband had failed to comply with the decree in refusing to
arrange for the mileage to be redeemed as airline tickets. The ex-hus-
band responded that the airline would not transfer the mileage from one
account to another. The trial court then held a hearing at which it or-
dered the parties to file briefs supporting their positions. The court ren-
dered a clarifying decree that the ex-husband was to take all necessary
steps to permit the ex-wife to redeem the frequent flier miles. By way of
dicta the court seemed to say that a clarifying order under section
9.008226 cannot be issued if it is not enforceable by contempt. 227 The
court went on to say that a clarifying order may be rendered on the re-
quest of a party or on the court's own motion unless otherwise provided
in section 9.001(b). 228 Thus, the order could issue without a hearing on
the merits.229
By agreement of the parties on divorce, the decree at issue in Wright v.
Eckhardt230 awarded the wife one-half of the husband's naval retirement
benefits when the husband's "name is officially added to the Navy retire-
ment list."'2 31 At the time of the divorce in 1994, the ex-husband was in
active naval service though in 1997 he had left active duty status and had
joined the Fleet Reserve. Thus, the ex-husband was then in receipt of
retainer pay in an amount equal to his future retirement pay, but he had
not been recalled to active duty. Nonetheless, his name had not been
added to the Navy's retirement list. After the ex-wife had begun to re-
ceive payments under a clarifying decree, a second motion for clarifica-
tion was filed by the ex-husband in 1998. This motion asserted that the
decree should be further clarified to provide that the ex-wife should not
be entitled to receive her share of his retirement benefits until after com-
pletion of his duty in the Fleet Reserve in 2007. The court granted the ex-
husband's request and it was that clarification that was before the appel-
late court.
In reversing the second clarification order, the Corpus Christi appellate
court concluded2 32 that the original decree had thereby been modified
rather than clarified. It is not required by section 9.008(b)2 33 that in or-
der to clarify a decree the court must find that the division is not specific
226. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.008 (Vernon 1998).1998, no writ), also decided under
§ 3.72.
227. See Traylor v. Traylor, 789 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. App-Texarkana 1990, no writ)
(decided under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.72, the precursor of § 9.008); McLaurin v.
McLaurin, 968 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (also decided under
§ 3.72).
228. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.001(b) (Vernon 1998).
229. Alford, 40 S.W.3d at 190.
230. 32 S.W.3d 891 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
231. Id. at 893.
232. Id. at 894-95.
233. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.006(b) (Vernon 1998).
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enough to be enforceable by contempt. That is merely one of two
grounds that the court may employ to enter a clarifying order. The other
ground is provided in section 9.006(a), which states that the court may
render "further orders to enforce the division of property made in the
decree of divorce ... to assist in the implementation of or to clarify the
prior order. '234 The substantive division of property as made in the origi-
nal decree had been modified because it extended the time for her enti-
tlement beyond the ex-husband's retirement from active duty.2 35 Thus,
the phrase in the original decree that referred to the husband's name be-
ing "officially added to the Navy retirement list" was not a formal prereq-
uisite of the ex-wife's entitlement. Rather, it was merely to be
interpreted in conjunction with other terms of the decree to mean when
the ex-husband would receive his half-share of retainer pay of which he
had been in receipt since he joined the Fleet Reserve. 236
The appeal in Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. ChappellP37 stemmed from a
dispute arising from an oral fee-contract between a law firm and its client.
The firm asserted that the wife retained the firm to represent her in a suit
for divorce at $150 an hour for a total of over $60,000. The client re-
sponded that the entire fee was not to exceed $3,000, which had been
paid. The firm also asserted that the client (while insolvent) had made
fraudulent transfers of assets to third-party defendants (her mother and a
close friend and former business partner of her husband) to hinder the
efforts of the firm to collect its fee. The client asserted, in turn, that the
firm had breached its fiduciary duty in representing her and had violated
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Debt Collection Act. The jury
rendered a verdict of $43,000 to the firm for its fees and $5,000 in dam-
ages for the fraudulent transfers. The jury also found that the firm had
breached its fiduciary duty to the client for which it awarded $5,000 de-
spite suffering no damage therefor. The jury futher found that the firm
had violated the statutes as alleged, but that the client had not suffered
any damage for those violations. The trial court decreed a $5,000 forfei-
ture of the plaintiff-firm's fee for its breach of fiduciary duty. Despite the
trial court's denial of the firm's damages for the fraudulent transfers, the
appellate court restored these damages2 38 and remanded the case on the
issue of the firm's claim for attorney's fees.239
In Brown v. Fullenweider240 the parties to a divorce reached an agree-
ment incident to a divorce by which, among other things, each party
would pay "all outstanding attorneys fees and fees for other professionals
234. Wright, 32 S.W.3d at 894.
235. Id. at 895-96.
236. Wright v. Eckhardt, 32 S.W.3d 891, 895-96 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no
pet.).
237. 37 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, no writ).
238. Id. at 27-28, 31.
239. Id. at 29, 31.
240. 7 S.W.3d, 333, 335 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999), rev'd, No. 00-0137, 2001 WL
299317, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 553 (Tex. Mar. 29, 2001).
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incurred by [him of her] in connection with this lawsuit. '241 The court
further ordered that the parties "shall do all necessary acts to carry out
the provisions of such agreement. '242 Under former Family Code sec-
tions 3.70 - 3.77 (now sections 9.001 - 9.014) just over a year after rendi-
tion of the decree incorporating the parties' agreement, the ex-husband's
attorney sought a judgment against his client for his fees and those of
others employed in connection with the divorce. At the attorney's re-
quest, the divorce court severed the attorney's claim from the divorce
case, docketed it under a new number, and granted him a judgment for
his fees. A divided Court of Appeals speaking through Justice Hill (re-
tired, sitting by assignment) concluded that the attorney for the husband
was a party to the proceedings for the purpose of his claim,243 and that
fixing the uncertain amount owed was a clarification for enforcement of
the order. On further appeal by the husband's attorney, in a per curiam
opinion the Supreme Court of Texas held that the attorney's "motion was
filed long after the trial court's plenary jurisdiction ... had terminated,
and jurisdiction was not properly maintained under section 3.70."244 The
court gave two further reasons for its conclusions. First, the court said
that the decree did not award fees to the attorney, but merely "allocated
responsibility for any such fees" between the spouses as it did "for all the
parties' obligations. ' 245 The court's second reason for its conclusion was
that the expeditious means provided by these provisions were meant
solely for "those related to the division of a marital estate. An attorney's
claim against his client for fees is not such an issue. '246
241. For the specific provisions of the terms see Brown v. Fullenweider, 7 S.W.3d 333,
335 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999), noted in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, 53 SMU L. REV. 995 1045 (2000).
242. Brown, 7 S.W.3d at 334.
243. See John M. Gillis, P.C. v. Wilbur, 700 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
no writ); Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Collins v. Dawson, 478 S.W.2d 121 123 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
244. Brown, 2001 WL 299317, at *2.
245. Id. at *1.
246. Brown v. Fullenweider, No. 00-0137, 2001 WL 299317, *2 (Tex. Mar. 29, 2001).
20011 1415
1416 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
